How many rebel groups are in syria

It claims to control some 11, fighters in total. His group claims to have 17 sub-brigades totaling at least 9, fighters, although some recently defected to form the independent Dawood Brigade.

They have now co-opted around 50 groups across Syria, including in the southern provinces of Damascus, Deraa and Qunaytira, although they are by far strongest in the Idlib region. It presents itself as a moderate Salafist movement. Other Mainstream Rebel Factions There are hundreds of additional rebel units and coalitions. Many are affiliated with the SMC or some other large alliance, but there are also those that work alone.

Most seem to be small groups representing a single village or a few families, but some are far bigger and capable of offensive operations even outside their home region. Ahrar al-Sham was never a part of the SMC, but it has a record of working well with its affiliates. It is an explicitly Salafist alliance that makes no pretense of supporting democracy, instead demanding an Islamic state. The U. In April , Jabhat al-Nusra split. Of the other Salafi-jihadi factions in Syria, the most prominent has been Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa-al-Ansar.

There are also several smaller independent jihadist groups, such as the Homs-based Jund al-Sham, which draw on militant networks in northern Lebanon. They have occasionally defended against regime incursions, but more often clashed with Arab rebels, particularly Islamist factions and Turkey-backed groups. When left to their own devices, the Syrian PKK affiliates have focused on ensuring party control over all Kurdish areas and repressing or co-opting local rivals.

Syrian and Foreign Pro-Government Militias The activities of Syrian and foreign pro-government militias have been obscured by the leading role of the official Syrian Arab Army, but there are a number of non-state and foreign-linked actors in Syria that fight for the al-Assad regime. In , it stepped up its previously low-key raids into Syria from northern Lebanon. This catch-all term for al-Assad supporters was popularized by the opposition in , but there is no organization by that name.

At the start of the uprising, several families and tribes who had enjoyed government patronage organized vigilante groups. In Aleppo, the Berri mafia—a criminal gang from a politically-connected Sunni clan—helped quash demonstrations until rebels massacred several Berri leaders in July The last remaining opposition stronghold is in the north-western province of Idlib and adjoining parts of northern Hama and western Aleppo provinces. The region is dominated by a jihadist alliance called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham HTS , but is also home to mainstream rebel factions.

An estimated 2. In March , Russia and Turkey brokered a ceasefire to halt a push by the government to retake Idlib. There has been a relative calm since then, but it could break down at any moment. In the country's north-east, Turkish forces and allied Syrian rebels launched an offensive against the SDF in October to create a "safe zone" clear of Kurdish YPG militia along the Syrian side of the border, and have occupied a km 75 miles long stretch since. To halt the assault the SDF struck a deal with the Syrian government that saw the Syrian army return to the Kurdish-administered region for the first time in seven years.

The government has vowed to eventually regain full control of it. It does not look like it will anytime soon, but everyone agrees a political solution is required. Nine rounds of UN-mediated peace talks - known as the Geneva II process - failed to make progress, with President Assad apparently unwilling to negotiate with political opposition groups that insist he must step down as part of any settlement. Russia, Iran and Turkey set up parallel political talks known as the Astana process in An agreement was reached the following year to form a member committee to write a new constitution, leading to free and fair elections supervised by the UN.

But in January , UN special envoy Geir Pedersen lamented that they had not even begun drafting any reforms. Mr Pedersen also noted that, with five foreign armies active in Syria, the international community could not pretend the solutions to the conflict were only in the hands of the Syrians. Image source, Reuters.

How did the Syrian war start? Image source, AFP. How many people have died? Who's involved? How has the country been affected? Who is in control of the country now? Will the war ever end? Related Topics. Both sides have garnered external military support, which has aggravated the conflict.

Violations of the laws of war, including violations amounting to war crimes, have been committed on all sides of the conflict, though not necessarily by every combatant or faction; this would need to be studied on an individual basis. Non-state armed groups can to some extent be distinguished at the political and ideological level. ISIS and al-Qaeda, for example, are jihadist groups with transnational agendas, i. Many are organised on a local geographic basis or around specific personalities who may have access to resources.

It often does not make sense to ascribe a developed ideological character or program to most non-jihadist rebel groups. There is a high degree of fluidity between groups, if not at the leadership then certainly at the level of rank-and-file fighters: allegiances shift rapidly depending on local conditions, impressions of military prowess and the availability of superior weaponry and funding.

Many non-ideological or non-jihadist groups have collaborated in tactical alignments with jihadists on the battlefield or are otherwise related to them through personal or familial ties. Nonetheless, factions on nearly all sides of the war have carried out acts of violence that could be fairly described as inducing terror on civilian populations.

Lethal and non-lethal support to rebel groups has been provided for a number of reasons, including pressuring the regime to negotiate a political transition that ends the war — or, for some donors, just toppling the regime outright — as well as enabling the fight against ISIS. Non-lethal assistance to rebel groups and others should be understood in that context. Donor states must weigh these benefits, however, against the cost of providing such support in the case of rebel groups, including the opportunity cost of aiding groups that 1 may commit human rights abuses and worse; 2 may be engaged in criminal activity; 3 may be fluid in their membership; 4 may not have full control over their personnel and equipment; and 5 may have political objectives that are inconsistent with those of the providing states, except in the short-to-medium term.

The actual — as opposed to intended — destination of military lethal or non-lethal cross-border assistance has been difficult to monitor without a physical presence inside Syria, and is largely unknowable.